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INCONSISTENT RATIONALES FOR 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS 
Russell L. Christopher* 
While capital punishment is constitutional, death row prisoners 
argue that ‘‘capital punishment plus’’-----execution plus decades of 
post-sentencing, pre-execution incarceration-----is unconstitutional. In 
denying that capital punishment plus violates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, courts employ 
three principal rationales. First, lengthy delays between sentencing 
and execution are attributable to and the fault of prisoners. Second, 
lengthy delays affording thorough appellate and collateral review are 
necessary to ensure the accuracy and fairness of death sentences. In 
short, accuracy trumps speed. Third, the lengthy review process ex-
tending prisoners’ stay on death row is necessary to satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment. That is, delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amend-
ment cannot violate it. This Article argues that these rationales are in-
consistent with each other. The first rationale-----delay is the prisoner’s 
fault-----is inconsistent with the second and third rationales-----delay is a 
consequence of what is constitutionally permissible, desirable, and 
obligatory. The first rationale blames prisoners for the very delays 
that the other two rationales defend and justify as consequences of 
what is affirmatively good. As inconsistent rationales, at least one is 
incorrect, and all three are suspect. While not conclusively establish-
ing that capital punishment plus is unconstitutional, this Article 
erodes the foundations of its constitutionality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of the length and nature of the interval between capi-
tal sentencing and execution is startling. What was once a brief period of 
custodial detention is now a de facto punishment nearly as severe as the 
de jure punishment that follows it. Writing about England in the 1700s, 
legal historian William Blackstone reported, ‘‘it is enacted by statute that 
the judge, before whom a murderer is convicted, shall in passing sentence 
direct him to be executed on the next day but one . . . .’’1 While from our 
contemporary perspective two days between sentencing and execution is 
unfathomably brief, Blackstone nonetheless described it as a torturous, 
‘‘short but awful interval’’ for the prisoner.2 The interval must be short, 
Blackstone explained, because ‘‘it is of great importance, that the pun-
ishment should follow the crime as early as possible’’ in order to further 
the penological goals of punishment.3 The typical interval in colonial-era 
America was longer: one to several weeks.4 In the modern era, the na-
tionwide average period of delay between sentencing and execution 
jumped from two years in 1968,5 to six years in 1984,6 to eight years in 
1989,7 to ten years in 1994,8 to twelve years in 1999,9 to fourteen years in 
2009,10 to sixteen years in 2011,11 and to ‘‘about eighteen years’’ in 2014.12 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *202 (internal citation omitted) (stating that exe-
cution must occur two days after the sentence).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at *397 (‘‘[T]he prospect of gratification . . . [from] commit[ting] the crime, should instant-
ly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate these ideas; and 
then the execution itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight, than as the neces-
sary consequence of transgression.’’).  
 4. E.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 17 (2002).  
 5. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 n.37 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (noting that the national 
median period of death row incarceration in 1968 was 33.3 months). 
 6. See TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013--STATISTICAL 
TABLES 14 tbl.10 (rev. 2014) [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS 2013].  
 7. See id.  
 8. See id.  
 9. See id.  
 10. See id.  
 11. See id.  
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In the two leading death penalty states (by number of persons on death 
row)-----California and Florida13-----the current average delay is twenty-five 
years.14 These averages, however, do not tell the full story. Recently, the 
Supreme Court declined review of a prisoner on death row for thirty-
nine years.15 Far from being an isolated instance, nearly 200 prisoners na-
tionwide have been on death row for over thirty years.16 Of those, over 
fifty have been on death row for about thirty-five years17 and twenty-five 
have been on death row for approximately forty years.18 Skeptical the ev-
er escalating ‘‘trend will soon be reversed,’’ Justice Stephen Breyer ex-
trapolates that the average term of death row incarceration will eventual-
ly exceed fifty years.19 
What was once an execution preceded by a de minimis, but none-
theless ‘‘awful,’’20 period of administrative or custodial detention meas-
ured in days or weeks is now ‘‘two separate punishments: lengthy incar-
ceration under very severe conditions (essentially solitary confinement in 
many states), followed by an execution.’’21 The death penalty has become 
the equivalent of (de facto) incarceration in the form of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole plus (de jure) capital punishment. 
With death row prisoners receiving ‘‘decades-plus-death,’’22 these increas-
ingly lengthy periods of death row incarceration have transformed a 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Execution List 
2014, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2014 (last visited 
May 30, 2017)). 
 13. DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.15 (California------735, Florida------398). The next 
three states with the most death row prisoners are Texas------273, Pennsylvania------190, and Alabama------
190. Id. By the Department of Justice’s latest statistics, these five states ‘‘held 60% of all inmates on 
death row on December 31, 2013.’’ Id. at 1.  
 14. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he State admitted that the last 10 
prisoners executed in Florida had spent an average of nearly 25 years on death row before execution.’’ 
(citing Tr. of Oral Arg. in Hall v. Florida, O.T. 2013, No. 12-10882, pg. 46)); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. 
Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that in California delays between sentencing and execu-
tion exceed ‘‘25 years on average’’).  
 15. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). The prisoner, Thomas Knight, received his death sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 528 
U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Therefore, he had been incarcer-
ated on death row for thirty-nine years.  
 16. See DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 18 tbl.15 (citing 192 current death row prisoners 
originally placed there from 1974 to 1985).   
 17. Id. (citing fifty-one current prisoners originally placed on death row from 1980 to 1982).  
 18. Id. (citing twenty-five current prisoners originally placed on death row from 1974 to 1979).  
 19. Justice Breyer explains as follows: ‘‘Nearly half of the 3,000 inmates now on death row have 
been there for more than 15 years. And, at present execution rates, it would take more than 75 years 
to carry out those 3,000 death sentences; thus, the average person on death row would spend an addi-
tional 37.5 years there before being executed.’’ Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764--65 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citing DOJ STATISTICS 2013, supra note 6, at 14 tbl.11, 18 tbl.15) (emphasis added). Adding the fif-
teen years already spent on death row to Justice Breyer’s speculated additional time of 37.5 years re-
sults in a sum of 52.5 years on death row, on average.    
 20. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *202. 
 21. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? Reflections on 
(Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 30 LAW & INEQ. 211, 
230--31 (2012).  
 22. Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged of Death Row Should Be Deemed Too 
Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1124 (2012).  
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death sentence from capital punishment per se into capital punishment 
plus. 
In the wake of this transformation of both the length and nature of 
death row incarceration, prisoners began to contest the constitutionality 
of capital punishment plus. In what have become known as ‘‘Lackey 
claims’’ since 1995 when Clarence Lackey petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari, prisoners have advanced two reasons that execu-
tion following decades of death row incarceration is disproportionate 
punishment violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.23 As Brent Newton, counsel for Lackey and ar-
chitect of the Lackey claim explained:  
[F]irst . . . execution after [incarceration] under the extreme condi-
tions of death row for such a lengthy period of time would exact 
more punishment than . . . the Eighth Amendment [allows]; and 
second, that neither of the state’s primary interests . . . -----
retribution and deterrence-----would be meaningfully served . . . after 
such a lengthy delay . . . .24  
Despite Justice Breyer and former Justice John Paul Stevens repeatedly 
endorsing the Lackey claim as meritorious,25 there is no standing court 
decision-----state or federal-----recognizing the claim.26 
In repeatedly denying Lackey claims, courts principally invoke the 
following three rationales. First, death row prisoners choose to pursue 
appellate and collateral review of their sentence.27 As chosen by prison-
ers, the consequence of that choice-----delay between sentence and execu-
                                                                                                                                      
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (‘‘[N]or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.’’). Although the 
Supreme Court denied Lackey’s petition, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari), the similar claims brought by numerous other death row prisoners 
have become known as ‘‘Lackey claims.’’ E.g., Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting 
that a claim of excessive delay between sentence and execution violating the Eighth Amendment ‘‘is 
commonly known as a ‘Lackey claim’’’); Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Succes-
sive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762 (2002) (‘‘[T]he 
claim of inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly known as a ‘Lackey claim’ . . . .’’).   
 24. Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 41, 54--55 (2012).  
 25. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous De-
bate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 681 (2010) (‘‘Over the past fifteen years, Justices Stevens 
and Breyer have repeatedly called for the Court to address the issue, with Justice Breyer characteriz-
ing the claim as ‘serious,’ (quoting Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari)), and ‘particularly strong,’ (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)), and Justice Stevens ultimately declaring that pro-
longed death row incarceration is ‘unacceptably cruel,’ (quoting Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 
1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)).’’). For Justice Breyer’s most recent dissent 
from a denial of certiorari of a Lackey claim, see infra note 36.   
 26. See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 
2010) (‘‘[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [Lackey claims] . . . .’’). For decisions ruling capital 
punishment unconstitutional based on excessive delay that have been superseded or reversed, see infra 
notes 54, 55, 73 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial 
of certiorari) (emphasizing that the ‘‘petitioner chose to challenge his death sentence’’); McKenzie v. 
Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 n.21 (9th Cir. 1995) (‘‘[T]o the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in 
the hope of obtaining relief, that is a choice they make for themselves.’’).  
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tion-----is attributable to the prisoners and not the state.28 Second, appel-
late and collateral review of capital sentences is necessary to ensure their 
accuracy and fairness.29 Therefore, the consequence of such review-----
delay between sentence and execution-----must be constitutionally permis-
sible.30 Third, appellate and collateral review of capital sentences is nec-
essary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.31 Delays caused by satisfying 
the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it.32 
These three rationales have been extraordinarily influential in dis-
patching Lackey claims. Nearly every court denying such claims on the 
merits have invoked at least one, if not all three.33 Most of the federal cir-
cuit courts have endorsed all three.34 The leading opponent of Lackey 
claims on the Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas, utilizes at least 
two of them.35 Furthermore, these rationales have apparently influenced 
the full Court, which has steadfastly declined to review Lackey claims 
over the last twenty years.36 
Despite the icy reception of Lackey claims in the courts due to the 
pervasive influence of these three rationales, three recent developments 
suggest signs of a thawing. First, in March 2014, Justice Anthony Kenne-
dy, often the crucial ‘‘swing vote’’ in high profile cases that split an ideo-
logically divided court,37 signaled a potential endorsement of Lackey 
                                                                                                                                      
 28. See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (‘‘The delay 
of which he [the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .’’). 
 29. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (‘‘[T]he cause for the delay . . . [was 
that the prisoner] ‘availed himself of procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are carried 
out only in appropriate circumstances.’’’ (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466--67)). 
 30. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(‘‘[D]eath row delays do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay results from the 
‘desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that might save 
someone’s life.’’’ (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998))). 
 31. See, e.g., White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the state’s ‘‘interest in 
insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally mandated safeguards’’).  
 32. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467 (‘‘We cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying 
the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.’’); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (‘‘It 
would be a mockery of justice to conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment 
themselves violate it.’’). 
 33. See, e.g., Jane Marriott, Walking the Eighth Amendment Tightrope: ‘Time Served’ in the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, in AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY: INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES AND 
IMPLICATIONS 159, 179 (Jon Yorke ed., 2008) (‘‘[There are] three forms of reasoning that inevitably 
le[a]d to the [Lackey] claim being rejected. First . . . that courts may find compelling reasons for the 
delay. Second . . . delays caused by way of satisfying the demands of the Eighth Amendment simply 
cannot violate it. Third . . . the delay was not attributable to the state . . . .’’); infra note 49. 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. See infra Part II.  
 36. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting 
‘‘the total absence of Supreme Court precedent’’). For the most recent denial of certiorari of a Lackey 
claim triggering a response by a Justice, see Correll v. Florida, Nos. 15-6551, 15A424, 2015 WL 
6111441, at *1 (Oct. 29, 2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘I remain convinced 
that the Court should consider whether nearly 30 years of incarceration under sentence of death is 
cruel and unusual punishment.’’). 
 37. Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the Future of 
Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 979--80 (2014) (quoting Charlotte Schneider, Supreme Court 
2012-13 Term Highlights, LEGAL INFO. INST. SUP. CT. BULL., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/ 
supreme_court_2012-2013_term_highlights (last visited May 30, 2017) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  
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claims.38 During oral argument for Hall v. Florida, Justice Kennedy re-
peatedly asked Florida’s counsel whether average delays of twenty-five 
years were ‘‘consistent with the purposes of the death penalty.’’39 Justice 
Kennedy ‘‘may be on the brink of joining Justice Breyer and former Jus-
tice Stevens’’ in urging the full Court to address Lackey claims.40 
Second, in July 2014, a federal court recognized a Lackey claim for 
the first time.41 Jones v. Chappell held that execution following nineteen 
years on death row violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment for two reasons.42 First, because of system-
ic inordinate delay, so few death row prisoners will actually be executed 
(as opposed to dying of old age or other causes while on death row) as to 
make execution unconstitutionally arbitrary.43 Second, delays are suffi-
ciently lengthy ‘‘that the death penalty is deprived of any deterrent or re-
tributive effect it might once have had.’’44 On appeal, however, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed Jones on procedural grounds.45 
Third, in June of 2015, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed sup-
port for Lackey claims for the first time. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Glossip v. Gross that identified ‘‘unconscionably long 
delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose’’46 as one 
of three ‘‘fundamental constitutional defects’’47 in the imposition of capi-
tal punishment. In addition to undermining capital punishment’s peno-
logical justifications, ‘‘lengthy delay in and of itself is especially cruel be-
cause it ‘subjects death row inmates to decades of especially severe, 
dehumanizing conditions of confinement.’’’48 
In light of these recent developments suggesting a renewed appreci-
ation of Lackey claims, this Article critically examines the principal ra-
tionales that presently serve to deny Lackey claims. It makes the novel 
argument that these three influential rationales are inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                                      
 38. Id. at 980. 
 39. Id. at 991 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 46--47, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014) (No. 12-10882), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-
10882_7758.pdf.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Newton suggested that Justice Kennedy’s ques-
tioning is significant for two reasons: ‘‘First, they did not appear to be off the cuff. In the oral argument 
of a case in which certiorari had been granted on a legal issue that had nothing to do with Lackey, Jus-
tice Kennedy clearly had prepared for his Lackey-related questions because he cited an arcane statistic 
about the average delay before executions in the past ten Florida cases.’’ Id. at 992. ‘‘Second, his re-
peated question about ‘the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve’ certainly appears to 
allude to the primary arguments made by Justices Stevens and Breyer in addressing Lackey claims 
since 1995.’’ Id.  
 40. Id. at 980. 
 41. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1052--53 (C.D. Cal. 2014).  
 42. See id. at 1053.  
 43. See id. at 1062--63.  
 44. Id. at 1063.  
 45. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2015) (ruling that the death row prisoner’s 
Eighth Amendment claim impermissibly sought application of a new constitutional rule of criminal 
procedure on collateral review).  
 46. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 47. Id. at 2755.  
 48. Id. at 2765 (quoting Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement 
respecting denial of certiorari)).  
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each other. The first rationale-----delay is the prisoner’s fault-----is incon-
sistent with the second and third rationales-----delay is a consequence of 
that which is constitutionally permissible, desirable, and obligatory. In 
short, the first rationale blames prisoners for the very delays that the 
other two rationales defend and justify as consequences of what is af-
firmatively good. This inconsistency renders at least one, or as many as 
all three, of the rationales incorrect. While not conclusively establishing 
the unconstitutionality of capital punishment plus, this inconsistency 
does undermine the foundations of its constitutionality. 
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part II presents each of 
the three principal rationales courts employ to deny Lackey claims in 
greater depth. After tracing the origin of each rationale, this Part exam-
ines their use by Justice Thomas, federal circuit courts, federal district 
courts, and state courts. 
Part III argues that the three principal rationales supporting the 
constitutionality of capital punishment plus are inconsistent with each 
other. The prisoner-fault rationale conflicts with both the accura-
cy/fairness rationale and the rationale that delays caused by satisfying the 
Eighth Amendment cannot violate it. The prisoner-fault rationale seeks 
to blame and hold prisoners responsible for what the other two ration-
ales seek to defend and justify as consequences of what is constitutionally 
permissible, desirable, and obligatory. Part III next considers the effects 
of these rationales’ inconsistency. It explains that either (1) the prisoner-
fault rationale is wrong, (2) the other two rationales are wrong, or (3) all 
three rationales are wrong. Because the rationales’ inconsistency entails 
that at least one of the rationales is wrong, but does not inform which 
one or ones are wrong, their inconsistency raises doubts as to each ra-
tionale. Finally, Part III considers possible resolutions and consequences 
of the inconsistency. This Article concludes that consistency bars courts 
from invoking all three rationales and their inconsistency erodes the 
foundations of the constitutionality of capital punishment plus. 
II. PRINCIPAL RATIONALES SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS 
This Part presents more expansively each of the three principal ra-
tionales employed to deny Lackey claims.49 It identifies the origin of each 
                                                                                                                                      
 49. See Karl S. Myers, Comment, Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding Execution After a 
Long Stay on Death Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v. Texas, 106 DICK. L. REV. 647, 661 (2002) 
(‘‘[T]here are several fundamental reasons why . . . courts have rejected Lackey claims:  first, that the 
need for careful review commands the delay; second, that upholding the claim would result in an in-
consistency with other Eighth Amendment requirements; and third, because the state did not negli-
gently or intentionally cause the delay.’’); see also Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (‘‘[C]ourts often 
rely on two justifications for rejecting the . . . [Lackey claim]:  first, . . . delay is reasonably related 
to . . . safeguard[ing] the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring the accuracy of . . . [the] death . . . 
sentence, and second, . . . delay is caused by the petitioner himself, and therefore cannot be constitu-
tionally problematic.’’); Angela April Sun, Note, ‘‘Killing Time’’ in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: 
Why Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 
1602--04 (2013) (identifying as the principal arguments against Lackey claims as first, the post-
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rationale, examines their subsequent use, and charts the breadth of their 
adoption by Justice Thomas, federal circuit courts, federal district courts, 
and state courts. 
A. Prisoner Fault 
Perhaps the single most prevalent rationale used to deny Lackey 
claims is that delays between sentencing and execution are the prisoners’ 
own fault.50 Though not always expressly articulated, unpacking the ra-
tionale reveals the following steps of argument. Prisoners choose to pur-
sue appellate and collateral review of their capital sentences. A conse-
quence of such review is delay. The consequence of prisoners’ choice-----
delay-----is therefore the responsibility and fault of the prisoners.51 This 
Section traces the history of the prisoner-fault rationale. First, it discusses 
the first case to invoke the rationale and surveys all subsequent pre-
                                                                                                                                      
conviction review process that causes the delays are necessary for accuracy and ensuring due process 
and second, whether the state or prisoner bears responsibility for the delay); Marriot, supra note 33 at 
179.  
 50. See, e.g., Rapaport, supra note 22, at 1090 (‘‘For many jurists attribution of fault [between the 
prisoner and the state for the delay] is critical to resolving [the Lackey claim].’’). See generally supra 
note 49.  
 51. For authorities rejecting this rationale, see Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[Petitioner] bears little, if any, responsibility for this 
delay.’’); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985--86 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiora-
ri) (noting that delay resulted not from prisoner fault but from two different ‘‘constitutionally defec-
tive sentencing proceedings’’); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (noting that much of the twenty-seven year delay stemmed from ‘‘the State’s re-
peated procedural errors’’); Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1066 (‘‘[M]uch of the delay in California’s post-
conviction process is created by the State itself, not by inmates’ own interminable efforts to delay.’’); 
People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting prisoner-fault 
rationale and noting that nearly all Lackey claims are nonfrivolous); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 
1291 (Mont. 1996) (Leapheart, J., concurring) (rejecting prisoner-fault rationale where prisoner has 
been successful in appeals because ‘‘the blame properly rests with the State or the courts’’); 
Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 SCR 348, 353 (‘‘We think that the cause of the delay is 
immaterial when the sentence is death.  Be the cause for the delay the time necessary for appeal . . . or 
some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it would not alter the dehumaniz-
ing character of the delay.’’); Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and 
Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22 (1998) (‘‘[D]efective 
[state] processing systems are the true cause of most of the delay in capital cases.’’); Russell L. Chris-
topher, The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for Excessively Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
3, 34--74 (2015) (contending that the rationale lacks an explicit basis and that neither of its possible 
bases------analogizing to attribution of fault in the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right context and waiv-
er of the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment------are persuasive); Michael 
Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and Extended Stays on 
Death Row, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 85, 105--06 (2014) (‘‘[I]t should not matter whether the inmate was 
the partial cause of his own delayed execution.  The justice system does not allow inmates the right to 
starve themselves or to otherwise engage in self-harm.  Prisoners should similarly be barred from pun-
ishing themselves with additional time on death row.’’); Newton, supra note 24, at 64 (‘‘[T]he delays 
occasioned by such discretionary appeals, at least non-frivolous ones, should not be attributed to in-
mates who pursue such appeals.’’); Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court’s 
Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurispru-
dence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 581 (2001) (‘‘[D]elay of execution, regardless of who is responsible and 
whether it is intentional or inadvertent . . . giv[es] rise to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment un-
der the Eighth Amendment.’’); Jeremy Root, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration 
of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 299 (2001) (‘‘Frivolous petitions account 
for an infinitesimal fraction of the typical period of delay.’’). See generally infra note 61. 
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Lackey cases. Second, it presents Justice Thomas’s articulations of the 
rationale. Third, it canvasses post-Lackey state and lower federal courts’ 
adoption of the rationale. 
1. Pre-Lackey Decisions 
Perhaps the 1960 case Chessman v. Dickson is the first case to ex-
press the prisoner-fault rationale.52 In denying the prisoner’s claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment stemming from delay of over eleven years, 
the Ninth Circuit court stated, ‘‘I do not see how we can offer life (under 
a death sentence) as a prize for one who can stall the processes for a giv-
en number of years, especially when in the end it appears the prisoner 
never really had any good points.’’53 
The next two cases addressing the issue rejected the prisoner-fault 
rationale, finding excessive delay unconstitutional. In 1972, in People v. 
Anderson, the California Supreme Court held that ‘‘[a]n appellant’s in-
sistence on receiving the benefits of appellate review of the judgment 
condemning him to death does not render the lengthy period of impend-
ing execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty from constitu-
tional proscription.’’54 In 1980, in District Attorney for Suffolk District v. 
Watson, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled ‘‘that the de-
lay may be due to the defendant’s insistence on exercising his appellate 
rights does not mitigate the severity of the impact on the condemned in-
dividual, and the right to pursue due process of law must not be set off 
against the right to be free from inhuman treatment.’’55 
Subsequent cases in the pre-Lackey era all invoked the prisoner-
fault rationale. In 1986, the court in Richmond v. Ricketts, citing Chess-
man, explained that the twelve-year delay failed to violate the Eighth 
Amendment because it ‘‘was prompted by Richmond’s request . . . to 
have his challenges . . . heard by several courts.’’56 Affirming Richmond in 
1992, the Ninth Circuit supported its use of the prisoner-fault rationale 
                                                                                                                                      
 52. 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960).  
 53. Id. A subsequent case interprets this proposition as ‘‘distinguish[ing] between innocent de-
lays and delays caused by a defendant’s dilatory tactics.’’ Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 
1995).   
 54. 493 P.2d 880, 895 (Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 90 (Cal. 2009) (rejecting the state’s argument 
‘‘that these delays are acceptable because they often occur at the instance of the condemned prison-
er’’). 
 55. 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980), superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. 
art. CXVI, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 393 Mass. 150, 150 (1984). The court re-
jected the prisoner-fault rationale offered by the dissent: ‘‘[t]o the extent that a defendant resorts to 
those endless appellate procedures, he should not be heard to complain about the prolongation of his 
period of anxiety and agony over his possible execution.’’ Id. at 1302. Further explaining the irrele-
vance of the prisoner’s choice, the court noted, ‘‘[i]t is often the very reluctance of society to impose 
the irrevocable sanction of death which mandates, ‘even against the wishes of the criminal, that all 
legal avenues be explored before the execution is finally carried out.’’’ Id. at 1283 (quoting Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).  
 56. 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986). For a brief discussion of Chessman, see supra notes 52--
53 and accompanying text.  
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by offering Chessman and Andrews v. Shulsen57 as ‘‘relevant, though not 
controlling, precedents.’’58 The court explained that the Andrews ‘‘court 
reasoned that to accept the petitioner’s argument would be ‘a mockery of 
justice’ given that the delay was attributable more to petitioner’s actions 
[of challenging his death sentence] than to the state’s.’’59 In 1995, just pri-
or to Lackey, the Seventh Circuit in Free v. Peters found that ‘‘any inor-
dinate delay in the execution of Free’s sentence is directly attributable to 
his own conduct.’’60 
2. Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas emphasized prisoners’ choice of and fault for execu-
tion delays in all four of his concurrences to the denial of certiorari of 
Lackey claims.61 In Knight v. Florida, Justice Thomas characterized the 
prisoner as ‘‘avail[ing] himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral 
procedures and then complain[ing] when his execution is delayed.’’62 In 
Foster v. Florida, Justice Thomas commented that the ‘‘[p]etitioner could 
long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting to 
what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.’’63 In 
Thompson v. McNeil, Justice Thomas emphasized that the ‘‘petitioner 
chose to challenge his death sentence’’64 and quoted from a Fourth Cir-
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 431 (D. Utah 1984). 
 58. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 59. Id. (quoting Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431). The prisoner in Andrews was not making a Lack-
ey claim, but instead argued that the repeated setting and staying of execution dates violated the 
Eighth Amendment. Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431. Andrews reasoned that ‘‘[t]he extensive and re-
peated review of petitioner’s death sentence was sought by petitioner and is afforded by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments and by federal law. To accept petitioner’s argument would create an 
irreconcilable conflict between constitutional guarantees and would be a mockery of justice.’’ Id. 
 60. 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir. 1995).  
 61. Apart from Justice Thomas, the only other current member of the Supreme Court that has 
addressed the rationale is Justice Stephen Breyer. Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer is clearly not 
a proponent of the rationale.  But also unlike Justice Thomas, his precise view is not entirely clear. In 
individual cases he maintains that delay was the fault of the state and not the prisoner. E.g., Thompson 
v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1120 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[The thirty-
two year] delay here resulted in significant part from constitutionally defective death penalty proce-
dures for which petitioner was not responsible.’’); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (referring to ‘‘astonishingly long delays flowing in significant 
part from constitutionally defective death penalty procedures’’); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[The prisoner] has experienced that [twenty-
three year] delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous appeals on 
his own part.’’); supra note 51. But Justice Breyer never clearly rejects the prisoner-fault rationale as 
irrelevant in principle. The closest he comes to doing so is as follows: ‘‘one cannot realistically expect a 
defendant condemned to death to refrain from fighting for his life by seeking to use whatever proce-
dures the law allows.’’ Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay). 
Justice Breyer’s most recent statement possibly concerning the rationale, though not specifically refer-
ring to it, suggests that at least some causes of delay may be irrelevant: ‘‘though these legal causes [ad-
herence to constitutional procedural requirements] may help to explain, they do not mitigate the 
harms caused by delay itself.’’ Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by 
Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 62. 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999). 
 63. 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting id. at 993) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
 64. 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
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cuit concurring opinion: ‘‘It makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . 
for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of 
delay . . . has secured the almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, 
to then claim that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sen-
tence unconstitutional.’’’65 Finally, in Johnson v. Bredesen, Justice Thom-
as reiterated the above statement from Knight.66 
3. Post-Lackey Decisions 
The most influential American case deciding a Lackey claim is per-
haps McKenzie v. Day.67 Rejecting the prisoner’s claim that execution 
following a twenty-year delay violates the Eighth Amendment, McKen-
zie stated that ‘‘[t]he delay has been caused by the fact that McKenzie 
has availed himself of [opportunities to challenge his sentence].’’68 
McKenzie stressed that delay is the choice of the prisoner: 
A number of death row inmates have refused to avail themselves of 
avenues of review precisely to avoid this ordeal [of decades on 
death row]. This option is available to anyone sentenced to die, and 
to the extent petitioners choose to delay execution in the hope of 
obtaining relief, that is a choice they make for themselves.69 
Numerous other federal circuit court cases have denied Lackey claims by 
relying on the prisoner-fault rationale.70 Federal district court cases71 and 
state cases72 have similarly rejected Lackey claims on this basis. The only 
                                                                                                                                      
 65. Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).  
 66. See 558 U.S. 1067, 1071 (2009).  
 67. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 68. Id. at 1466--67.  
 69. Id. at 1470 n.21 (citations omitted).  
 70. See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 957 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing the prison-
er’s claim from other cases where ‘‘much of the delay had been due to the State’s own errors’’); Cham-
bers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) (‘‘Delay has come about because Chambers, of 
course with justification, has contested the judgments against him, and, on two occasions, has done so 
successfully.’’); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (‘‘White has had the choice of seek-
ing further review . . . or avoiding further delay of his execution by not petitioning for further re-
view . . . .’’); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (‘‘[B]ecause Appellant chose to 
avail himself of stays to pursue these avenues of review, they may not be used to support an Eighth 
Amendment claim.’’); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (‘‘The 
delay of which he [the prisoner] now complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strate-
gy . . . .’’); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995) (‘‘Fearance was not the unwilling victim of 
a Bleak House--like procedural system hopelessly bogged down; at every turn, he . . . sought extensions 
of time, hearings and reconsiderations.’’); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(‘‘We note that Porter has proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have been attribut-
able to negligence or deliberate action of the state.’’).   
 71. See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *40 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 
2010) (‘‘[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the prisoner’s claim] . . . especially where both par-
ties bear responsibility for the long delay.’’); Hairston v. Paskett, No. CV--00--303--S--BLW, 2008 WL 
3874614, at *8 (D. Idaho Aug. 15, 2008) (‘‘[P]rolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does 
not offend the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the delay results from the prisoners unsuccessful 
pursuit of collateral relief and not from the State’s dilatory tactics.’’); Delvecchio v. Illinois, No. 95 C 
6637, 1995 WL 688675, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (‘‘Petitioner has extended the time . . . of his exe-
cution and therefore, any additional punishment caused by the delay is attributable to the petition-
er.’’).  
 72. See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997) (‘‘[D]efendant’s claim that the 
state is solely responsible for the delays in this case is inaccurate.’’); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 
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post-Lackey decision recognizing a Lackey claim, Jones v. Chappell, re-
jected the prisoner-fault rationale not on principle but on empirical 
grounds: ‘‘much of the delay in California’s post conviction process is 
created by the State itself, not by inmates’ own interminable efforts to 
delay.’’73 
B. Post-Conviction Review Necessary for Accuracy and Fairness 
Many courts reject Lackey claims on the ground that a lengthy post-
conviction review process is necessary to ensure an accurate and fair ver-
dict or sentence so that no innocent is convicted and punished. Unpack-
ing the rationale reveals the following steps of argument. Because accu-
racy and fairness are constitutionally valuable, any consequence of that 
pursuit of accuracy and fairness must be constitutionally acceptable. De-
lay between sentencing and execution is such a consequence. Therefore, 
such delay must be constitutionally acceptable. In short, accuracy trumps 
speed.74 
                                                                                                                                      
(Cal. 1992) (‘‘Defendant, however, does not------and in good faith cannot------allege even the slightest un-
due delay by the state in this case.’’); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011) (‘‘Valle ‘cannot now 
contend that his punishment has been illegally prolonged because the delay in carrying out his sen-
tence is in large part due to his own actions in challenging his conviction[s] and sentence.’’’ (quoting 
Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008))); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151 (Idaho 
1999) (‘‘Death row prisoners are not entitled to have their sentences commuted to life because of the 
delay caused by their own unsuccessful collateral attacks on their sentences.’’); Bieghler v. State, 839 
N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (‘‘[T]he time between his conviction and the approaching execution flows 
from his having availed himself of the appeals process.’’); State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 492 (La. 2011) 
(‘‘Much of the delay in the direct appeal is clearly attributable to the defendant . . . . Thus his argument 
contending the length of time on death row violates the Eighth Amendment rings hollow.’’); Jordan v. 
State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001) (‘‘[T]he Constitution would not protect a defendant who 
availed himself of the ‘panoply of appellate and collateral procedures’ and then claimed that his execu-
tion had been too long delayed.’’ (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari))); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (noting that de-
fendant ‘‘has availed himself [of the review process] . . . which has resulted in the delay and the multi-
ple sentencing hearings in this case’’); Moore v. State, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (‘‘The delay in 
carrying out the sentence of death has been caused by the fact that Moore has availed himself of [the 
review process].’’); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 486 (Tenn. 2002) (‘‘As in most cases, the delay in 
the instant case was caused in large part by numerous appeals and collateral attacks lodged by the Ap-
pellant.’’).  
 73. 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 74. For authorities criticizing this rationale, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (‘‘The right not to be subjected to inhuman treatment [prolonged death row 
incarceration] cannot, of course, be played off against the right to pursue due process of law.’’); Jones 
v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting that a prisoner must choose between 
speed and accuracy); Dist. Att’y Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. 1980) (‘‘[T]he 
right to pursue due process of law must not be set off against the right to be free from inhuman treat-
ment.’’); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., concurring) (‘‘I see no simple 
answer to the conundrum which results from the conflict between a defendant’s right to due process 
and appellate review and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.’’); DAVID PANNICK, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY 84 (1982) (‘‘[A] death sentence becomes unconstitutional-
ly cruel unless carried out within a reasonable time . . . and without the incidental infringement of any 
of the other rights (such as the right to appeal against conviction and sentence) guaranteed by due 
process.’’); Newton, supra note 24, at 64 (‘‘[I]t is axiomatic in our legal system that a person should not 
have to waive one constitutional right in order to exercise another.’’); Rapaport, supra note 22, at 
1126--27 (‘‘[T]he proper way to frame the Eighth Amendment issue is not as a choice between dispatch 
and delay.’’); Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged 
Death Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 218 (1999) (‘‘Re-
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Perhaps the first decision invoking this rationale is Richmond v. 
Ricketts in 1986.75 Richmond rejected a twelve-year delay as constituting 
cruel and unusual punishment because ‘‘it is better to take the time to 
consider each issue [presented by the prisoner] thoroughly rather than 
quickly dispatching someone to the gas chamber.’’76 Affirming the district 
court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit found relevant a case relied upon by 
the lower court-----Harrison v. United States.77 In Harrison, the Supreme 
Court ‘‘held that an eight-year delay between an arrest and sentencing 
was not unconstitutional where the delay resulted from the need to as-
sure careful review of an unusually complex case.’’78 The Ninth Circuit 
returned to this theme of error prevention justifying delays in McKenzie 
v. Day.79 McKenzie stated that ‘‘[t]he delay has been caused by the . . . 
procedures our law provides to make sure that executions are carried out 
only in appropriate circumstances.’’80 According to McKenzie, ‘‘most of 
these procedural safeguards have been imposed by the Supreme Court in 
recognition of the fact that the common law practice of imposing swift 
and certain executions could result in arbitrariness and error in carrying 
out the death penalty.’’81 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit rejected a Lackey 
claim based on a seventeen-year delay because the prisoner’s ‘‘claim de-
mands that capital punishment be carried out quickly in spite of the im-
portance of thorough fact-finding in capital cases and the state’s compel-
ling interest in ensuring that it does not execute innocent defendants.’’82 
In Chambers v. Bowersox, the Eighth Circuit contended, ‘‘delay, in large 
part, is a function of the desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it 
right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that 
might save someone’s life.’’83 Denying that a thirty-one year stay on death 
row violated the Eighth Amendment, the Eleventh Circuit quoted ap-
provingly the above language from Chambers.84 
                                                                                                                                      
quiring a prisoner to forgo either the right to appeal his sentence or an Eighth Amendment claim [un-
constitutionally] forces the prisoner to choose the protection of one constitutional guarantee over an-
other.’’); Root, supra note 51, at 326 (‘‘To suggest that a citizen loses the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment because he chooses to pursue appellate review of his capital sentence seems highly im-
proper.’’).  
 75. 640 F. Supp. 767, 803 (D. Ariz. 1986).  
 76. Id. 
 77. Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (1992) (citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 
219, 221 n.4 (1968)). 
 78. Id. 
 79. 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995).  
 80. Id. at 1466--67. 
 81. Id. at 1467. 
 82. White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1996); accord. id. at 440 (‘‘On the merits, these 
claims would likewise fail because the delay that White complains of arises from post-conviction pro-
ceedings which exist to protect White and which White, himself, requested when he petitioned for ha-
beas relief.’’). 
 83. 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 84. Thompson v. Sec’y Dep’t. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (‘‘[D]eath row delays 
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay results from the ‘desire of our courts, 
state and federal, to get it right, to explore . . . any argument that might save someone’s life.’’’ (quoting 
Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570)). 
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State courts rejecting Lackey claims also invoke this rationale. Both 
the Supreme Courts of Montana and Nebraska approvingly quoted 
McKenzie’s above language.85 The Supreme Court of Illinois approvingly 
quoted the above language from Chambers.86 The Indiana Supreme 
Court rejected a Lackey claim, reasoning that ‘‘[t]o ensure the just ad-
ministration of the death penalty the value of speed should not trump ac-
curacy.’’87 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that 
‘‘[t]he value of speed should not trump the value of accuracy.’’88 
C. Post-Conviction Review Necessary to Satisfy Eighth Amendment 
The last of the principal rationales employed to deny Lackey claims 
is that delays that are a consequence of adherence to the Eighth 
Amendment or other constitutional mandates cannot be unconstitution-
al. Unpacking the rationale reveals the following steps of argument. The 
various levels of appellate and collateral review are constitutionally nec-
essary, and a consequence of that which is constitutionally necessary 
must also be constitutional. The consequence of post-conviction review is 
delay between sentence and execution. Therefore, such delay is constitu-
tional. In short, delay caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment can-
not violate it.89 
Two federal circuit court opinions have advanced the most influen-
tial versions of this rationale.90 In White v. Johnson, the Fifth Circuit de-
nied a Lackey claim involving seventeen years on death row because 
‘‘there are compelling justifications for the delay between conviction and 
                                                                                                                                      
 85. State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466--67); 
State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (quoting McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466--67).  
 86. People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (Ill. 2000) (quoting Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570). 
 87. Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 55 (Ind. 2002). 
 88. State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 493 (La. 2011).  
 89. For criticisms of this rationale, see Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (‘‘A death penalty system that is unreliable or procedurally unfair 
would violate the Eighth Amendment.  And so would a system that, if reliable and fair in its applica-
tion of the death penalty, would serve no penological purpose [because of excessive delay].’’) (citation 
omitted)); Russell L. Christopher, Absurdity and Excessively Delayed Executions, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 843, 896--98 (2016) (the third rationale erroneously conflates what is necessary to satisfy the 
Eighth Amendment with what is sufficient); cf. Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 648, 650--51 (2000) 
(‘‘The court [denying the Lackey claim] failed to acknowledge the possibility that extensive post-trial 
procedures could be both necessary and cruel------necessary because they satisfy a constitutional man-
date, and cruel because they generate delays prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.’’).  
 90. It is not entirely clear whether Justice Thomas articulates this rationale. He at least comes 
quite close in his following statement: ‘‘[c]onsistency would seem to demand that those who accept our 
death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution 
as a necessary consequence.’’ Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (concurring in denial of certi-
orari). And Justice Thomas quotes this statement approvingly in two of his other concurrences to the 
denial of certiorari of Lackey claims. Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (quoting 
Knight, 528 U.S. at 992); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 992). 
If Justice Thomas’ phrase ‘‘death penalty jurisprudence,’’ Knight, 528 U.S. at 992, may be understood 
as the constitutional requirements for the imposition of the death penalty prescribed by the Supreme 
Court, then Justice Thomas seems to be arguing that delay is a necessary consequence of satisfying 
capital punishment’s constitutional requirements. Interpreted in this way, Justice Thomas might well 
be arguing that because delay is necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements, delay must be consti-
tutionally acceptable. 
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the execution of a death sentence. The state . . . [has an] interest in insur-
ing that those who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally 
mandated safeguards.’’91 Decisions from the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
have approvingly quoted White’s argument that such delays stem from 
compliance with ‘‘constitutionally mandated safeguards.’’92 In McKenzie 
v. Day, the Ninth Circuit found the prisoner’s twenty-year delay ‘‘a con-
sequence of our evolving standards of decency, which prompt us to pro-
vide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest their convic-
tions and sentences.’’93 Because evolving standards of decency is a 
measure of the constitutionality of capital punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment,94 McKenzie is, in effect, declaring that delay is a product of 
satisfying the Eighth Amendment. In rejecting the prisoner’s claim of 
cruel and unusual punishment, the court stated, ‘‘[w]e cannot conclude 
that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves vio-
late it.’’95 
State courts have also invoked the rationale. Citing McKenzie and 
White, the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that ‘‘the very nature of 
capital litigation . . . suggests that delay . . . is the product of evolving 
standards of decency.’’96 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals main-
tained that ‘‘[t]he existence of delays in appellant’s case have arguably 
been necessary to ensure that his conviction and sentence are proper and 
not inhumane.’’97 The court explained that the Constitution ‘‘does not 
and cannot protect [death row prisoners] against those costs which are 
necessary and inherent in the exercise of the rights it guarantees.’’98 
Echoing McKenzie, the court is essentially stating that delays due to pro-
cedures necessary to satisfy the Constitution cannot violate the Constitu-
tion. The California Supreme Court, in a decision predating McKenzie, 
held that ‘‘[t]he existence of an automatic appeal under state law [that 
caused significant delay and prolonged the prisoner’s stay on death row] 
is not a constitutional defect; it is a constitutional safeguard.’’99 That is, 
delays caused by constitutional safeguards cannot be constitutional de-
fects. In People v. Ochoa, the California Supreme Court reasoned that 
‘‘the time required for our statutorily mandated review is not a violation 
of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights; it is essential to ensuring 
                                                                                                                                      
 91. 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 92. Thompson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting White, 79 
F.3d at 439); Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting White, 79 F.3d at 439). 
 93. 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 94. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (declaring that punishment which does not satisfy 
‘‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’’ may be unconstitutional-
ly cruel and unusual).  
 95. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. 
 96. Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998). 
 97. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc). 
 98. Id. (citing Louisiana ex rel. v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (holding only unnecessary 
suffering in the execution of a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment)).  
 99. People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (en banc). 
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that those rights are and have been respected.’’100 Again, the underlying 
principle is that delays essential to satisfying prisoners’ rights cannot vio-
late prisoners’ rights. Finding White persuasive and adopting McKenzie’s 
language, another California Supreme Court decision declared that ‘‘the 
delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it.’’101 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska advanced an even more forceful formu-
lation of McKenzie’s language: ‘‘[i]t would be a mockery of justice to 
conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment them-
selves violate it.’’102 
III. INCONSISTENCY OF THE RATIONALES 
This Part argues that the three rationales are inconsistent with each 
other. The first rationale blames and holds prisoners responsible for the 
consequences of what the second rationale acknowledges is necessary to 
ensure accurate and fair sentences and what the third rationale concedes 
is necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment and the Constitution. The 
first rationale blames and holds prisoners responsible for what the sec-
ond and third rationales defend as consequences of what is constitution-
ally permissible, desirable, and obligatory. In short, the first rationale 
seeks to blame prisoners for the very delays that the second and third ra-
tionales seek to justify as consequences of what is affirmatively good. Af-
ter establishing the rationales’ inconsistency, this Part considers various 
resolutions and consequences of the inconsistency. Part III concludes 
that, as a result of the rationales’ inconsistency, at least one of the ration-
ales is incorrect, and all three are suspect. 
A. The Prisoner-Fault and Accuracy/Fairness Rationales Conflict 
This Section argues that the accuracy/fairness rationale is incon-
sistent with the prisoner-fault rationale. The prisoner-fault rationale 
blames and holds prisoners responsible for the delays;103 the accura-
cy/fairness rationale defends and justifies the delays as consequences of 
ensuring accurate and fair death sentences and ensuring no innocent is 
executed.104 The prisoner-fault rationale blames and holds prisoners re-
sponsible for the very delays that facilitate and promote what the accura-
cy/fairness rationale defends as ‘‘the state’s compelling interest’’ in and 
‘‘the desire of our courts’’ for accurate and fair sentences.105 It is incon-
sistent to hold against prisoners the very same actions deemed constitu-
tionally permissible and desirable. 
                                                                                                                                      
 100. 28 P.3d 78, 115--16 (Cal. 2001) (quoting People v. Ochoa, 996 P.2d 442, 446 (1998)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 101. People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal. 1998) (citing McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 
(9th Cir. 1995)). 
 102. State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).  
 103. See supra Section II.A.  
 104. See supra Section II.B.  
 105. See supra notes 82--84 and accompanying text.   
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To further illustrate the inconsistency of the rationales, consider the 
accuracy-trumps-speed articulation of the accuracy/fairness rationale.106 
The prisoner-fault rationale blames prisoners for the very delays that fa-
cilitate and promote accuracy over speed. Prisoners causing delays 
through appellate and collateral review of their sentences promote (ra-
ther than undermine) accuracy over speed. If accuracy is preferred over 
speed, then there is no reason to blame prisoners for delays that promote 
accuracy. The two rationales are inconsistent with each other. The pris-
oner-fault rationale is instead consistent with the converse of the accura-
cy/fairness rationale-----a speed trumps accuracy rationale. If speed 
trumps accuracy, then it would be consistent to blame prisoners for de-
lays that undermine speed prevailing over accuracy. But since the accu-
racy/fairness rationale claims that accuracy trumps speed, blaming pris-
oners for seeking accuracy at speed’s expense is inconsistent. As a result, 
the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with the accuracy/fairness ra-
tionale. 
B. Prisoner-Fault and Eighth-Amendment Rationales Conflict 
This Section argues that the Eighth-Amendment rationale-----delays 
caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment cannot violate it-----is incon-
sistent with the prisoner-fault rationale. The two rationales conflict in 
two ways: the cause for the delays and the blame for the delays. First, the 
prisoner-fault rationale identifies prisoners as the cause of the delays;107 
the Eighth-Amendment rationale identifies satisfaction of the Eighth 
Amendment as the cause of the delays.108 If satisfying the Eighth-
Amendment is the cause of the delays (as the Eighth-Amendment ra-
tionale maintains), then prisoners are not the cause of the delays (contra-
ry to what the prisoner-fault rationale maintains). If prisoners, however, 
are the cause of the delays (as the prisoner-fault rationale maintains), 
then satisfying the Eighth Amendment is not the cause of the delays 
(contrary to what the Eighth-Amendment rationale maintains). By at-
tributing the cause of the delays to different sources-----death row prison-
ers and satisfaction of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner-fault and 
Eighth-Amendment rationales are inconsistent with each other.109 
                                                                                                                                      
 106. See supra notes 76, 87--88 and accompanying text.  
 107. See supra Section II.A.  
 108. See supra Section II.C. 
 109. One might argue that both are not ‘‘the cause,’’ but both are ‘‘a cause’’ of the delays.  As Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens commented, ‘‘delays have multiple causes.’’ Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 
1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Of course, when there is a plurality of 
causes there is a diminution of responsibility for any one cause or party. That is, if prisoners are a 
cause but not the sole cause of delays they should bear not full but at most partial responsibility. And 
there are many possible causes of the delays.  First, the State may be a cause by holding constitutional-
ly defective trials and sentencing hearings. See, e.g., Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Brey-
er, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (‘‘[M]uch of the delay at issue seems due to constitutionally 
defective sentencing proceedings.’’); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (characterizing delays as stemming primarily from states’ ‘‘constitutionally 
defective death penalty procedures’’). Second, States may fail to provide sufficient resources of court 
time and counsel for indigents to prevent delays. See, e.g., Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 
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Second, if the delays are caused by satisfying the Eighth Amend-
ment, and are thus constitutional as the Eighth-Amendment rationale 
maintains,110 then there is no legitimate reason to blame and fault prison-
ers for the delays. It is inconsistent to blame and hold prisoners responsi-
ble for the consequences of what is constitutionally obligatory. Moreo-
ver, why blame and fault prisoners for what is constitutionally obligatory 
for the State? It is the State, not a prisoner or defendant, that has consti-
tutional duties in criminal matters.111 The State, not the prisoner, has the 
ultimate constitutional responsibility for both the nature and manner of 
imposition of punishment.112 No matter what a prisoner chooses, causes, 
or intends, the State has the ultimate constitutional responsibility of not 
imposing cruel and unusual punishment.113 Therefore, it is inconsistent to 
                                                                                                                                      
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (‘‘[T]he dysfunctional administration of California’s death penalty system has result-
ed, and will continue to result, in an inordinate and unpredictable period of delay preceding . . . execu-
tion[s].’’); id. at 1056--57 (noting ‘‘the State’s underfunding of its death penalty system to be a key 
source of the problem’’). Third, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts may be yet another cause. 
See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certi-
orari) (‘‘[T]his Court and the lower federal courts have converted the constitutional limits upon impo-
sition of the death penalty . . . into arcane niceties which parallel the equity court practices described 
in Charles Dickens’ ‘Bleak House.’’’); id. (‘‘I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some 
responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice system.’’). For statements by Justice Thomas and 
former Justice Antonin Scalia that the Supreme Court is the sole cause of the delays, see infra text 
accompanying notes 116--18. 
 110. See supra Section II.C.  
 111. The State may be responsible for the consequences of defendants’ choices even in the argua-
ble absence of any State action.  For example, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court considered 
whether ineffectiveness of privately retained (not State-appointed) counsel constituted a Sixth 
Amendment violation of the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel. See 446 U.S. 335, 343 
(1980). Clearly, any ineffectiveness of counsel stemmed from the defendant’s choices and not the 
State. The defendant both chose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel and the defendant 
chose (selected) his counsel. If the consequence of those choices by the defendant was the ineffective-
ness of counsel, how could the State be responsible when the State did nothing to contribute to the 
ineffectiveness of counsel? The State advanced this very argument: ineffectiveness of ‘‘retained coun-
sel does not involve State action’’ and thus cannot be the basis for a constitutional violation.  Id. at 342. 
Rejecting the State’s argument, see id. at 344, the Court explained that ‘‘a state criminal trial, a pro-
ceeding initiated and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Id. at 343 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236--37 (1941); Moore 
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90--91 (1923)). Cuyler further explained that ‘‘[w]hen a State obtains a crimi-
nal conviction through such a trial [a trial in which the defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel], 
it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.’’ Id. at 343. Therefore, re-
gardless of defendants’ choices, it is the State that has the ultimate constitutional duty and responsibil-
ity to provide defendants with a fair trial. See id. at 344 (‘‘[T]he State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself 
implicates the State in the defendant’s conviction . . . .’’).  
 112. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (‘‘[T]he Eighth Amendment reaffirms 
the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.’’); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 
428 (1980) (‘‘[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to 
tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death pen-
alty.’’); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (‘‘The State, even as it 
punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings.’’); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (‘‘The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure 
that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.’’); Youngjae Lee, The Constitu-
tional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005) (‘‘The purpose of the 
Eighth Amendment ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ however, is to place constraints on the 
ways in which we pursue [the penological purposes of punishment].’’).   
 113. For example, suppose a death row prisoner intentionally becomes insane (by consuming ille-
gal drugs, ingesting toxic substances, or sustaining a head injury) for the purpose of delaying or per-
CHRISTOPHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2017  10:37 AM 
No. 4] CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PLUS 1381 
blame and hold prisoners responsible for consequences of what is consti-
tutionally obligatory for the State. As a result of either of these two bases 
of conflict or inconsistency, the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent 
with the Eighth-Amendment rationale. 
C. Resolutions and Consequences of the Inconsistency 
As argued in the two previous Sections, the three principal ration-
ales courts invoke to deny Lackey claims are inconsistent with each oth-
er. The prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with both the accura-
cy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales. Due to their 
inconsistency with each other, at least one of the rationales is incorrect. If 
the prisoner-fault rationale is correct, then both the accuracy/fairness and 
Eighth-Amendment rationales are incorrect. If the latter rationales are 
correct, however, then the prisoner-fault rationale is incorrect. The ra-
tionales’ inconsistency means either (1) the prisoner-fault rationale is in-
correct, (2) both the accuracy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales 
are incorrect, or (3) all three rationales are incorrect. Merely that they 
are inconsistent, however, cannot determine which of the three ration-
ales are incorrect. 
One obvious solution to the inconsistency is to simply eliminate the 
incorrect rationale(s), thereby expunging the inconsistency. But is there a 
basis for determining which of the three inconsistent rationales are incor-
rect? Courts and commentators have criticized all three.114 
Moreover, each of the three is inconsistent, not only with each oth-
er, but also with other arguments offered by those denying Lackey 
claims. Both the accuracy/fairness and Eighth-Amendment rationales 
conflict with the following remedy offered by Justice Thomas to a Lackey 
claimant objecting to twenty-seven years on death row: ‘‘[p]etitioner 
could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting 
to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.’’115 
Inviting death row prisoners to submit to execution, thereby foregoing a 
lengthy review process, is inconsistent with both the accuracy/fairness 
                                                                                                                                      
manently preventing execution. The prisoner chose to commit a capital crime with the possible conse-
quence of capital punishment. The prisoner also chose to harm herself with the possible consequence 
of insanity. The prisoner chose, is the sole cause of, and is at fault for everything------the commission of 
the crime, the punishment, and the insanity.  Surely the State can constitutionally execute the prison-
er? It cannot. As the Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright held, ‘‘the Eighth Amendment prohibits a 
state from carrying out a sentence of death upon a person who is insane.’’ 477 U.S. 399, 409--10 (1986). 
Executing an insane person constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. Ford announced a cate-
gorical bar against executing the insane.  See, e.g., Jonathan Greenberg, Note, For Every Action There 
is a Reaction: The Procedural Pushback Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 229 
(2012) (‘‘Ford . . . establish[ed] a categorical exclusion shielding [insane] defendants from capital pun-
ishment . . . .’’). That a person is insane is sufficient to trigger the bar, how the person became insane is 
irrelevant. That the insanity was a consequence (even intended) of the prisoner’s choices does not pre-
clude imposition of capital punishment on this prisoner from being unconstitutionally cruel and unu-
sual. 
 114. See sources cited supra notes 51, 74, and 89.  
 115. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(quoting id. at 993) (Breyer, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).  
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and Eighth-Amendment rationales that defend and justify the lengthy 
review process as necessary for accuracy, fairness, and satisfaction of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with arguments made by 
both Justice Thomas and former Justice Antonin Scalia that blame the 
Supreme Court for the excessive delays. While the prisoner-fault ra-
tionale blames prisoners for the delays, Justice Thomas argued in Knight 
v. Florida that ‘‘in most cases raising [a Lackey claim,] the delay in carry-
ing out the prisoner’s execution stems from this Court’s Byzantine death 
penalty jurisprudence.’’116 In dismissing Justice Breyer’s claim that capital 
punishment is unconstitutional due, in part, to excessive delay, Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, contended that the Supreme Court is 
the sole cause of the delays: 
Of course, this delay is a problem of the Court’s own making. As 
Justice Breyer concedes, for more than 160 years, capital sentences 
were carried out in an average of two years or less. But by 2014, he 
tells us, it took an average of eighteen years to carry out a death 
sentence. What happened in the intervening years? Nothing other 
than the proliferation of labyrinthine restrictions on capital pun-
ishment, promulgated by this Court.117 
Justices Scalia and Thomas are clearly stating that not only are delays a 
problem caused by the Court, but also that nothing other than the 
Court’s ‘‘Byzantine’’ and ‘‘labyrinthine restrictions on capital punish-
ment’’ are the cause of the delays.118 That would seem to exclude prisoner 
fault as a basis for the delays and contradict the prisoner-fault rationale. 
As a result, the prisoner-fault rationale is inconsistent with arguments of 
Justices Thomas and Scalia. 
Without an obvious resolution, the inconsistency of the three ra-
tionales has two effects-----one direct and another that is indirect and sub-
tler. First, either the prisoner-fault rationale or the other two rationales 
are incorrect. In denying Lackey claims, courts cannot consistently assert 
all three. Consistency bars their joint assertion. Consistency requires 
courts to choose either the prisoner-fault rationale or the other two ra-
tionales. The second effect, comparatively indirect and subtle, is that the 
joint inconsistency of the three rationales raises doubts about each indi-
vidually. While consistency permits assertion of either the prisoner-fault 
rationale or the other two rationales (but not all three), the very inde-
terminacy of which rationale is incorrect (and the possibility that all 
three might be incorrect) renders each individual rationale suspect. 
                                                                                                                                      
 116. 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).  
 117. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
 118. See supra notes 116--17 and accompanying text.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of execution plus decades of death row incar-
ceration-----capital punishment plus-----rests principally on three rationales. 
These three rationales, however, are inconsistent with each other. While 
establishing their inconsistency does not determine which of the ration-
ales are incorrect, it does establish that at least one of them is incorrect. 
Therefore, consistency bars courts from invoking all three rationales. 
While only jointly inconsistent, the very indeterminacy as to which ra-
tionale is incorrect renders each individual rationale suspect. Although 
not conclusively establishing the unconstitutionality of capital punish-
ment plus, the inconsistency of the three principal rationales erodes the 
foundations of the constitutionality of capital punishment plus. 
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